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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OP UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

]i Fourth Judicial District No.
i CR-88-491
]i Court of Appeals Docket No.
) 890268-CA

!

RONALD GEORGE STORRS,
Defendant/Appellant.

i Argument Priority
;i Classification No. 2

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Jurisdictional authority is conferred upon the Utah Court
of Appeals pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code Annotated
(1953 as amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.

Did the District Court err in concluding that

Appellant was lawfully arrested on the officerfs probable cause to
believe he was in possession of a controlled substance because of
his presence in a house where controlled substances were seized?
II.

Did the District Court err in concluding that

probable cause existed to arrest Appellant for possession of a
controlled substance based on one officer's conclusion that
Appellant was "high" because he laughed at him and on another
officerfs conclusion that after his detention the Defendant became
"mellow"?

1

III.

Do the provisions of Article I, Section 14 of the

Utah Constitution give greater protection to Appellant in this case
than do the provisions of the 4th Amendment to the United States
Constitution?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC.
CONSTITUTION OP THE UNITED STATES
Fourth Amendment
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
CONSTITUTION OP THE STATE OP UTAH
Article I, Section 14
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall
not be violated; and no Warrant shall issue but upon probable cause
supported by Oath or affirmation,

particularly describing the

place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from A FINAL judgment rendered by the
Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen in the Fourth District Court, Utah
2

County, State of Utah upon the Defendant's previously entered Plea
of No Contest to a charge of Possession of Controlled Substance, a
second degree Felony.

The Defendant was sentenced under the next

lower category of offense, a third degree Felony, to an
indeterminate term of not more than five (5) years in the Utah
State Prison. His sentence was suspended and he was placed on
probation for a term of 18 months upon conditions that he serve
thirty (30) days in the Utah County Jail and pay a $1,000 fine,
with an additional $250 to the Victim Reparation Fund.
STATEMENT OP THE CASE
The Defendant was charged by criminal information filed
on December 1, 1988 with Possession of Controlled Substance, a
second degree Felony.

He was released on his own recognizance.

A

preliminary hearing was held on December 27, 1988 in the Circuit
Court which bound him over to the District Court for arraignment
and further proceedings.
Counsel for the Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress and
this motion was heard on January 20, 1989 before the Honorable
Cullen Y. Christensen.

In a MEMORANDUM DECISION dated January 31,

1989 the Honorable Judge Christensen found 1) that the search of
the Defendant could not be supported by the search warrant alone,
2) that the search of the Defendant could not be justified on the
grounds of the "dangerous weapon" exception to the general
3

constitutional prohibition against warrantless searchers, but that
3) the warrantless search of the Defendant's person was justified
as a search incident to a lawful arrest as the officers had
probable cause to arrest the Defendant.
Subsequent to entry of the Court's MEMORANDUM DECISION,
Defendant entered a conditional plea of No Contest to the charge.
The final judgment of conviction was entered by Judge Christensen
on April 7, 1989.

Judgment was entered at the next lower category

of offense (third degree felony) on Defendant's Motion to Sentence
Under the Next Lower Category of Offense.
Defendant's Notice of Appeal was filed in the Court of
Appeals, State of Utah, on May 3rd, 1989. The trial court
thereafter granted Defendant's Motion for a Stay of Commitment.,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 30, 1988, at about 9 o'clock p.m., several
officers of the Pleasant Grove City Police Department executed a
search warrant on the residence of Debbie Nielsen in an attempt to
find drugs and drug paraphernalia [Preliminary Hearing Transcript
at 17-18 (PT)]. Defendant, Ronald George Storrs, was visiting in
the house but was not a resident. The warrant authorized a noknock, night time entry of the residence (PT 13) as well as the
search of "[a]ny person in the residence or any person arriving at
the residence during the search". The affidavit in support of the
4

warrant did not give reasons for the need to search non-residents.
Appellant was not named, described, or otherwise referred to in
either the warrant or the affidavit.
The officers executed the warrant by entering the house
from several locations without knocking or announcing their
presence. Immediately upon entering the residence by a side door, a
plain clothed officer rapidly approached Mr. Storrs who stood in a
hallway which led to the main-floor kitchen of the residence (PT
23).

When the officer identified himself and said that they had a

search warrant for the premises and the people inside, Mr. Storrs
laughed (PT 23).

The officer concluded that Mr. Storrs was "high

on something" (PT 25).
Mr. Storrs was confronted about five (5) feet from the
door of a bathroom, in the doorway of which a man was lying (PT 2425).

Next to this man, within the bathroom itself, was an empty

syringe (PT 21).

While no evidence is in the record as to the

contents of the syringe and no direct evidence as to its use or
intended use, it was inferred by a witness that the man had used it
to inject himself with cocaine (PT 21); No witness testified that
Mr. Storrs was seen assisting this man nor that he was seen close
enough to assist him.
Because of this laugh, and a remark made by Mr. Storrs
to the officer when told to put his hands on the wall, Mr. Storrs
5

was grabbed, thrown up against a wall, patted down for a weapon (PT
24) , handcuffed with his hands behind his back (PT 26) and taken
into another room to be watched while the search of the rest of the
home continued (PT 24). While detained, he was described as "quiet
and mellow" (PT 31).

Nothing was found in this initial pat-down

search of Mr. Storrs (PT 26).
As Appellant was detained, the search of the home
progressed and drugs were found in the downstairs bedroom of the
house occupied by Ms. Nielsen and in a pocket of a coat hanging in
the downstairs recreation room (PT 15-16) . Two other peirsons were
found in the downstairs bathroom allegedly in the possession of
cocaine which they were smoking out of an aluminum can (PT 15).
Once suspected drugs were found in the downstairs portion
of the residence, the officers downstairs told the officers
upstairs that the persons downstairs were under arrest for
possession of cocaine and to search everyone upstairs to see if
they were in also in possession of drugs.

One of those persons was

Mr. Storrs (PT 16). The search of the persons in the upstairs
portion of the house was conducted because everyone in the house
was being arrested for being in possession of controlled substances
(PT 34) .

6

Mr. Storrs was thereafter searched a second time, more
thoroughly. A folded piece of paper containing a controlled
substance was found inside one of his pockets. (PT 32-33).
No drugs were found in the upstairs portion of the
residence and Mr. Storrs was never seen by the officers in the
downstairs area of the residence nor was there any evidence
presented to show that he had ever been in the downstairs portion
of the residence. No evidence was introduced to establish that Mr.
Storrs had been in the home on any prior occasions, or that he had
any other link to the home's resident, or to any of the other
persons present, or knowledge of or connection with any of the
others1 independent use or possession of controlled substances.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
The arresting officers did not have probable cause
sufficient to form the reasonable belief that Appellant had either
the ability or intent to exercise dominion or control over the
controlled substances found elsewhere in the home. His mere
presence in the home where drugs were found - without other
probable cause independent of that which supported arrest of the
other occupants and specific to Mr. Storrs - did not establish a
nexus between him and the contraband. His arrest, therefore, was
unlawful and the search founded thereon illegal.
7

POINT II
Laughing at a police officer, like "nervous behavior,"
"furtive gestures," and other subjective manifestations of "wrongdoing", is not, in and of itself, an adequate indication that a
person is "high" on drugs or that he is in possession of drugs.
This observation did not provide legally sufficient probcible cause
upon which to base an arrest.

The similarly subjective observation

that Appellant became "mellow" after detention is likewise
inadequate as an indicator of criminal activity.

Appellant's

arrest for these reasons was unlawful and the search incident
thereto illegal.
POINT III
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, though
traditionally interpreted similarly to its federal counterpart, is
susceptible of being interpreted by this Court as giving greater
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures - especially
in the home - because of the mood of the people regarding
governmental interference at the time the provision was enacted.
The Utah Supreme Court has shown an inclination to so interpret the
Utah Constitution if the issue is properly brought before it. This
Court should use this opportunity to help in the development of an
independent Utah Constitutional authority for a stricter, broader
state standard regarding searches and seizures.
8

ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
For purposes of this brief, Appellant accepts the trial
court's ruling that the search of Appellant cannot be founded on
the face of the warrant, alone. Appellant therefore does not cite
to authorities that would not expand the specific language of the
warrant to imply coverage of unnamed persons or places, without
independent probable cause. Nevertheless, Appellant reserves
argument on this issue should the State seek to justify the search
on the strength of the warrant.
Similarly, Appellant accepts the trial court's ruling
that the search and seizure was not justified by reason of the
"dangerous weapon" exception to the general constitutional
prohibition against warrantless searches set forth in Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and codified in this state in Section 77-716, Utah Code.

For purposes of this brief, Appellant accepts that

his initial brief detention and pat-down was reasonable for the
safety of the officers conducting the search and to secure the
premises. Consequently, Appellant does not here argue the
application of such "Terry" principals but likewise reserves
argument on this issue in the event the State urges that the search
was founded on the principals of a pre-arrest justification.

9

Appellant does, however, argue that the detention beyond
the need for protection of the officers and the security of the
premises was unreasonable and that the trial court erred in
concluding that Appellant was lawfully arrested and searched
incident thereto.
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT APPELLANT WAS
LAWFULLY ARRESTED ON THE OFFICER'S PROBABLE CAUSE TO
BELIEVE HE WAS IN POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
SIMPLY BECAUSE OF HIS PRESENCE IN A HOUSE WHERE
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES WERE SEIZED
Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-2 (Supp. 1988), as part of the
Utah Controlled Substances Act, defines "Possession" or "use" to
meane03

the joint or individual ownership, control, occupancy,
holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, obtaining, or
the application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or
consumption, as distinguished from distribution, of
controlled substances and includes individual, joint, or
group possession or use of controlled substances. For a
person to be a possessor or user of a controlled
substance, it is not required that he be shown to have
individually possessed, used, or controlled the
substance, but it is sufficient if it is shown that he
jointly participated with one or more persons in the use,
possession, or control of any substance with knowledge
that the activity was occurring. Utah Code Annotated §
58-73-2(27) (Supp. 1988).
In State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 132 (Utah 1987) the

Utah Supreme Court held that the State needed to establish that the
produced contraband was
10

found in a place or under circumstances indicating that
the accused had the ability and the intent to exercise
dominion and control over it. The mere occupancy of a
portion of the premises where the drug is found cannot,
without more, support a finding of its knowing and
intentional possession by the accused. There must be
some additional nexus between the accused and the
contraband to show that the accused had the power and
intent to exercise dominion and control over it. State v.
Hansen, 732 P.2d at 132.
To the same effect see State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319
(Utah 1985); State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1263 (Utah 1983);
State v. Carlson, 635 P.2d 72, 74 (Utah 1981).
seen in other jurisdictions.

This rule is also

See for example State v. Hystad, 3 6

Wash.App. 42, 671 P.2d 793, 798 (1983); State v. Davis, 16
Wash.App. 657, 558 P.2d 263, 264 (1977); Petty v. People, 167 Colo.
240, 447 P.2d 217, 220 (1968); Glispev v. Sheriff, Carson City, 89
Nev. 221, 510 P.2d 623, 624 (1973).
As the authorities indicate, before a person can be
convicted of possession of a controlled substance, the State must
show that the contraband was subject to the dominion and control of
that person, with the intent to exercise dominion and control.

The

mere presence on the premises, even in the portion of the premises
where the contraband is found, is not enough to convict without the
showing of requisite intent and dominion and control of the
contraband by the accused. Arrest for this offense must be for

11

probable cause to believe one is reasonably suspected dominion,
control, and intent.
In this case, Appellant was initially observed by two
different police officers to be standing in a hallway leading to
the kitchen area adjacent to the main-floor front room of the
premises to be searched.

(Memorandum Decision, pp. 2 and 10).

Approximately three to five feet away from the Appellant was an
individual who was lying partially inside the bathroom, which
evidently opens into the hallway in which the Appellant was
standing.

The head and shoulders of the individual were in the

hallway and the remainder of his body was in the bathroom.
Allegedly found on the floor, next to the man who was lying on the
floor, was an empty syringe.

One of the officers specifically said

that the syringe was not in the hallway, where Appellant might have
been more likely to have had direct knowledge of it

(Memorandum

Decision, p. 12). It was also testified to that the syringe was in
plain view once you got into the bathroom

(Emphasis added) (PT

20) .
There is no evidence that Appellant had actual knowledge
of the presence of the syringe or that he had any knowledge what
the syringe had been used for, that it in fact had been recently
used, that the contents of the syringe was lawful or unlawful to
possess, that Appellant had handled the syringe, or that Appellant
12

showed recent or past needle marks. No evidence was introduced that
would indicate Appellant aided the other man in the other's
preparation or independent use of the syringe or that the syringe
was an implement customarily used for more than one injection.
Appellant's mere proximity to another who was suspected of drug use
did not provide the necessary nexus between Appellant and the
suspected use by the another.
The only drugs found during the search of the premises,
prior to the second, extensive search of Appellant's person, were
found in the downstairs portion of the house - areas where the
officers had reason to believe Appellant had not been. The specific
assignment in the mind of the officers in searching the premises,
was to go quickly to the basement area and try to find a particular
person (Debbie Nielsen) suspecting of selling controlled substances
(PT 14).

This is what was done.

As soon as entry was made

Appellant was found upstairs. In the process of this search, two
individuals were seen in the basement bathroom allegedly smoking a
controlled substance out of a can.

Controlled substances were

found in other parts of the basement, including a bedroom, and an
inside pocket of a coat hanging in the basement recreation room. It
was not established by testimony that Appellant was a usual or
frequent occupant of the residence or that he used or shared the
bedroom downstairs or that the coat in the recreation room belonged
13

to or was used by him.

Nor was it established or argued that

Appellant had been in the downstairs portion of the residence at
anytime immediately prior to or during the search, or for that
matter, at any time.
Once drugs were found in the downstairs portions of the
residence, as stated by one of the officers involved in the searchWe went upstairs or [sic] we secured everyone, advised all the
officers in the house that cocaine was present in the residence,
and advised the officers, which one of them would be Sgt. Steve
Frampton from Pleasant Grove Police Department, who was upstairs,
was in charge of security of the people, advised these officers
that people present were under arrest for possession of cocaine and
to search all of these people, check them to see if they were in
possession. One of them specifically would have been Ronald Storrs
[the Defendant].Trans. Suppress. Hearing, p. 16 (PT 16).
It is clear that the State made no showing that the
arresting officers had reason to believe Appellant had knowledge of
much less exercised dominion and control over the controlled
substances found in the downstairs portion of the premises.

Using

the State's rationale for the arrest, any person found in the house
at the time that drugs or other contraband were found in the
downstairs portion of the house would be subject to search as also
being "in possession" of the drugs or other contraband, no matter
where in the residence they were.

This rationale would extend to

delivery persons, persons making a professional visit such as a
social worker, clergymen or other religious visitors, neighbors who
dropped by to borrow something or to chat, and to friends who
14

stopped by for a visit.

It is not inconceivable that such a

distortion of the law could be further extended to persons standing
inside of an attached garage or to persons standing in the
backyard, where it is evident that they entered the yard via the
residence itself.
This is not simply a case of the officers failing to
develop the necessary quantum of evidence to arrive at an
acceptable threshold of knowledge that can be considered probable
cause for an arrest of Appellant on suspicion of drug possession.
Rather, the evidence the searching officers discovered in the home
supports only an opposite conclusion - that Appellant was not
involved in the drug possession. Appellant's mere presence in a
residence where drugs were found in the independent possession of
others did not provide probable cause for his arrest. The search of
his person based on such unlawful arrest should, therefore, have
been suppressed.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PROBABLE
CAUSE EXISTED FOR APPELLANT'S ARREST FOR POSSESSION OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE BASED ON ONE OFFICER'S CONCLUSION
THAT HE WAS "HIGH" BECAUSE HE LAUGHED AT HIM AN ON
ANOTHER OFFICER'S CONCLUSION THAT AFTER HIS DETENTION,
APPELLANT BECAME "MELLOW"
It was the testimony of one of the police officers that
Appellant laughed at him when he was told that they were there to

15

serve a search warrant.

It was the officer's conclusion

was high on something when he started laughing at me."

fl

[t]hat he

(Memorandum

Decision, p. 12). For his laugh, Appellant was searched, thrown up
against the wall when he made a remark, handcuffed behind his back
and seated on a couch in the front room of the premises being
searched.

The officer who took this action came to the conclusion,

without any other evidence, that Appellant was "high11.
It has been held in numerous cases that evidence of
nervous behavior or so-called "furtive gestures", without more,
does not rise to the level of articulable suspicion of wrong-doing.
See State v. Schlosser. 108 Utah Adv. Rep. 38, 40 (Utah 1989)
(acting "fidgety" not sufficient to rise to level of articulable
suspicion); State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 184 (Utah 1987)
(nervous behavior does not rise to level of reasonable suspicion);
State v. Holmes, 107 Utah Adv. Rep. 74, 77 (Utah App. 1989)
(furtive movements or gestures alone are insufficient to constitute
probable cause for search or arrest and other factors must be shown
which, in the totality of the circumstances, would lead a
reasonable and prudent person to believe that there is evidence of
criminal activity); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 976 (Utah App.
1988) (failure to make eye contact, as nervous conduct, when
confronted by a Highway Patrol trooper is consistent with innocent,
as well as criminal behavior); State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935, 944-45
16
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Another reason for the rule is that observing and

articulating the reasons and rationale for "nervous behavior" and
"furtive movements" calls for a totally subjective analysis on the
part of the person making the observation.

Such subjective

observations, without more, are an inherently inaccurate indicator
of human guilt or wrongdoing and enjoy no reliability at all.
It is clear that so-called "nervous behavior" is not
limited to failure to make eye contact with police officers,
slouching down in a seat, glancing around oneself, etc.

Nervous

behavior can include a laugh, cry, rapid breathing, etc., It can
include essentially any manifestation of human emotion.

As with

the cases involving eye contact and furtive movements, it is clear
that other manifestations of nervousness have not been accorded any
weight as evidence of wrong-doing or guilty knowledge.

Likewise,

these manifestations, without more, should not be used as an
indicia that the subject manifesting them is "high", as was done in
the instant case.
In the case at hand when Appellant was confronted by
police officers who entered the premises without knocking or
announcing themselves, and who told him that they had a warrant to
search the premises and the persons inside, he laughed.

Perhaps he

laughed where another person might have put a hand over his mouth
and deeply inhaled.

Another person might have uttered an
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being manhandled by police officers, detained against your will,
and cuffed with your hands against your back can be a sobering
experience•

Becoming "mellow" after being forced to undergo such

an experience is not to be considered unusual; and the District
Court erred when it considered being mellow in determining that
there was probable cause for the arrest of the Defendant•
As this laughter and so-called "mellowness" has no legal
significance in developing probable cause to detain, search or to
arrest Appellant, and there was no articulable suspicion on the
part of the officers that any exception to the rule against
warrantless searches might apply, the officers had absolutely no
reason whatsoever to initially detain and cuff the Defendant or to
arrest and re-search the Defendant at a later time.

Proper

procedure in such a matter would have been to determine his
identity and ascertain whether he was a regular occupant of the
premises.

Once it was determined that he was not, he should have

been released, absent, of course, sufficient evidence that he was
in illegal possession of contraband, which is discussed in Point I,
supra.
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that entry into their homes was restricted.

It is not unrealistic

to presume that many of those persons practicing polygamy may have
been in positions of influence both in respect to the public at
large and to those representing them in the state legislature, or
may have been members of the legislative body themselves.

Neither

is it unreasonable to presume therefore that because of this
historical and probably pervasive attitude of alienation,the State
constitutional provision gives greater protection to the citizens
of the State of Utah, then does the Constitution of the United
States to the citizens of the United States.
An analysis of the question is hindered considerably by
the dearth of cases in support of such a position or any indication
of legislative intent associated with the adoption of Article I,
Section 14, in stark contrast to the recorded debates over the
ratification of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.

The following appears to be the entire record of

the proceedings as to Article I, Section 14:
The Chairman:

Gentlemen, we will take up Section

14.
Section 14 was read and passed without amendment.
Official Reports and Debates of the Convention Assembled at Salt
Lake City on the 4th Day of March, 1895 to Adopt a Constitution for
the State of Utah. 319 (1898).
It is nevertheless submitted that this Court can, in an
appropriate situation, give a more liberal, independent, and
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protective interpretation to IMhP Utah Constitution than that given
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[The, _ ._..*, ii.J state constitutions u . ive _:e^: ,y,
from independent sources, _ ;s,j state courts are at
liberty to find within the provisions of their o\*n
constitutions greater protection than is afforded uncc-j
the federal constitution as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court, [citations] This is true even when
the constitutional provisions implicated contain simi1 ar
phraseology. Long gone are the days
when state courts will blindly apply United States
Supreme Court interpretation and methodology when m Lhe
process of interpreting their own constitutions.State v.
Newman. 108 Idaho 5, 10 n. 6, 696 P.2d 856, 861 n. 6
(1985) (emphasis added) quoted in State v. Johnson, 110
Idaho 516, 71A P.2d 1288, 1292 n. 1 (1986).
S

,

i

.ere stated b} the Mississippi Supreme

Court when it stated that
We accord to the u *:; - :- ipreme C C J I I ^ ^ ^tiuost re^tr^ .
:i ts interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. We must
however, reserve for this Court the sole and absolute
right to make the final interpretation of our state
Constitution and, while of great persuasion, we will i%;ot
concede that simply because the U.S. Supreme Court ~d
interpret a U.S. Constitutional provision that we m..bgive the same interpretation to essentially the samwords m :i provision of our state Constituticr
Penick v. :Jtate . * " <- - **d 54 7
'~i--. 1 ^ i.

I

Other states have also constr^d ttoir state
constitutional rr^^^^^*- -^ -~- v : J:-:
706 P.2d
xu

bllUUlC
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.,- , Amendme.i,

i. State v. Jones,

(Alaska 1985) the A l a ? ^ ^u^reme "ourt i^uiia that
*!<• cnirh

as

Article I, Section 14 as affording additional rights to those
granted by the United States Supreme Court under the federal
constitution."
decision.

The Washington Supreme Court made a similar

State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136, 143 (Wash. 1984).
In contrast to the decided lack of case law in support of

these greater State protections, Utah case law does explicitly
suggest the possibility of a different construction for Article 1,
Section 14 than is given the Fourth Amendment.

In the case of

State v. Watts Chief Justice Hall stated that though [we have
declined]
to depart in this case from our consistent refusal
heretofore to interpret article I, section 14 of our
constitution in a manner different from the fourth
amendment to the federal constitution, we have by no
means ruled out the possibility of doing so in some
future case. Indeed, choosing to give the Utah
Constitution a somewhat different construction may prove
to be an appropriate method for insulating this state's
citizens from the vagaries of inconsistent
interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the
federal courts.State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n. 8
(Utah 1988).
Other cases in which the need to brief state
constitutional issues have been urged, with an obvious eye toward
potentially expanding the coverage of the state provisions, include
State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah 1987) (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring); State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 805-06 (Utah L986) (in
which Justice Durham specifically stated that the Court approved
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allegation that the state constitution provides greater protection
in the area.
In this case counsel did specifically argue that a
different interpretation was possible under the provisions of
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution (PT 9-11).

Counsel

for the State responded briefly (PT 12).
Also, it is clear that the State and the officers
involved perceive that the officers were acting pursuant to Section
77-7-16, Utah Code Annotated (1953) and to Section 77-23-1 et seq.,
Utah Code Annotated (1953).

Any time that a police officer acts

pursuant to these statute, Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution is implicitly raised and is applicable to any
discussion based on search and seizure issues, whether or not the
arguments submitted by counsel are primarily based on federal case
law is immaterial.
If this Court were to take a position on the relative and
independent protections founded in Article I, Section 14, it is
felt that the conflicting federal interpretations of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution would be unraveled and
police officers and practitioners and the general citizenry of the
state would be able to rely on a bright line - if not a "brighter
line" - approach to many of the issues raised in this area, issues
which are aggravated by continuing and conflicting federal
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the statutory restrictions on its jurisdiction to review criminal
cases where this issue is most likely to be raised.
CONCLUSION
The denial of the Defendant's Motion to Suppress should
be reversed as the State failed to show that the officers had the
necessary probable cause required by the federal constitution and
the existing interpretations of the Utah Constitution to effect the
arrest upon which the search was based. Further, although the case
law is sparse and the distinction difficult to make in light of the
lack of legislative history, the provisions of Article I, Section
14 of the Utah Constitution can and should be interpreted
independent of the federal constitution to broaden the protections
afforded the people of the state to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures
DATED this 31st day of August, 1989.
Respectfully submitted by:

THOMAS H. MEANS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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